Before one can determine whether or not Janet is a person, several crucial bits of information need to be collected. Despite the fact that Janet is capable of interacting with others on a social level rather than a merely instinctual level, emote, and problem solve, one needs to determine whether or not she is capable of doing these things intentionally. Being able not only to reason, but also to exhibit forethought—more precisely, intention, or sentience (being aware that she is doing these things)—are both important criteria for the qualification of personhood. In order to determine if Janet possesses this quality, one must define the varying levels of brain activity and decide where she falls.

The behaviors of DNA, RNA and viruses are pre-programmed with Boolean responses to ensure ‘survival’ (or replication). These pseudo-organisms exhibit the lowest form of reasoning, which qualifies merely as an instinctual or reflexive response to differing stimuli in the environment. These inherent behaviors prove Darwin correct in his assertion that evolution is the result of the survival of the fittest. There is no evidence of decision-making; those organisms that do not exhibit beneficial behaviors simply die.

The next level of intellectualization is that of the organism that realizes it has several options to use in response to a given situation. It will react with that response which experience has taught it is the most effective; ‘A tiger is running at me. Last time the tiger chased me, I ran from the tiger. I got away. I will run this time as well.’

Next is the organism that can, on encountering a new situation, evaluate the various responses of which it is capable, choosing beforehand which would bring about the most beneficial results; ‘I am faced with a tiger that looks like it will chase me. There is a tree, but I can’t climb. There is water but I can’t swim. However, I can run very fast, therefore I will run.’

Next, the thought processes are based on extra-psychic tools such as research or instruction; ‘I see a tiger in the distance. My mother told me that a tiger ate Uncle Albert because he was fat and slow and tigers are fond of our flesh. What can I do if it sees me? I once read in the Encyclopedia Britannica that tigers can swim and climb trees and run faster than I can, but will not run after me if it is preoccupied, so if it comes near, I will throw a steak at it and sneak away quietly.’

Lastly, the highest level of brain processes are the self-aware, or sentient, thought processes—those generally associated with ‘people’ or ‘personhood’; ‘I am thinking. What am I thinking about? I am thinking about what I would do if a tiger should ever try to attack me. Upon reflection, I don’t think I am qualified to answer that question, so I think I had better learn what to do, in case I ever plan to go to Africa.’

Janet’s activities seem to suggest that she possesses the ability to evaluate situations and choose the best reaction beforehand, and that she can be taught, but there is no given evidence that she can perceive that she is thinking or learning. There is no evidence that she is doing more than responding to her environment, which is the difference between sensitivity and sentience. Sensitivity is an organism reacting to its environment, and sentience is, in part, an organism’s ability to anticipate environmental activities.

Humans have a species bias that tends to prevent organisms that qualify as human beings from being labeled as anything but ‘persons’, and tends to resist labeling anything non-human as a ‘person’. However, sentience is generally a qualification for personhood, and if Janet does not possess it, then it is hard to qualify her as a person, whether or not she is human.

My answer to the first question won’t change if we reveal Janet to be a dolphin, nor would it change if she were a spaniel or a spider or a duckbilled platypus. My qualifications for personhood do not include ‘humanity’ in the phylogenic sense. I would be fully convinced that she was a ‘person’ if Janet were to evidence that she was self-aware, or if she were proven able to recognize that she was capable of thought—not merely reacting to her environment in a way that was beneficial to her continued survival (instinct).

At this time, we are fairly certain that the human animal is the only organism yet discovered that is capable of such self-awareness. One could argue that an animal must have a certain sophistication of thought processes in order to accomplish some of the more complex feats of survival (‘outwitting’ of prey, nest-building, etc.) i.e. whose thought processes fall within the middle three categories mentioned in part 1. However, it can also, and more convincingly be argued that the animal is not truly thinking in order to accomplish these tasks. For example, when people (humans) walk, do they think, ‘I am going to walk. First, I am going to take a step with my left foot. This involves contracting the muscles that…etc.’? No. Natural activities are conducted without any conscious effort. For humans, walking is a natural activity, and only those activities that involve the practiced use of tools require a concentrated effort, and even then, usually only until the tool-mastery is attained.

It can be assumed that other organisms (mammals, at least) experience this same method of managing life, and that complex feats of survival are merely instinct at work, and not evidence of sentience. From this, it can be concluded that, until Janet is able to communicate to humans that she is aware of herself and that she thinks, Janet is not a ‘person’.

Janet has to be given some freedom, relief from boredom. The Aqua-Zoo staff may argue that she’s safer here than in the sea, that she has good relationships with the staff, but I have yet to see her given room to express herself. She is only run through monotonous training sessions and performances day after day, as her mind wastes away to nothing, like the atrophication of an unused muscle. I tell you, my friends, caging cognition is crazy!

People have argued that humans have dominion over the animals and that it is our right to confine them for our own entertainment because we are smarter than they are. But, what these people fail to consider is that, if we can do these things merely because we are smarter, in fact, merely because we can, is it then our right to treat retarded humans as fodder for our entertainment? Surely, we are smarter than someone with Down’s syndrome? And then, aren’t we smarter than our own children? Shall we exhibit and cage our own? Never! Of course not. And why? Because this, my friends, is an example of slavery!

Bigotry runs rampant in a society that claims to be free-thinking. Merely because a creature is covered with feathers or equipped with flippers instead of hands, it is automatically assumed that it cannot think and therefore deserves to suffer at our hands. In fact, we distance ourselves so much as to eliminate any thought that the creatures could be suffering. This is the downfall of our society. Until we are willing to accept the fact that animals deserve the right to happiness as much as humans—we even presume to disassociate ourselves from the animal kingdom in name—we are no better than the plantation owners of southern America in the 1860’s. Remember, slaving smarts is stupid!

What the activists of the Dolphin Liberation League fail to take in to consideration is the fact that the dolphins are animals, that though they are clearly capable of complex reasoning techniques, they are not sentient—merely sensitive. The DLL anthropomorphizes these creatures, projecting their own view of the world onto a brain that is not capable of such consciousness, and at the same time give their humanized animals only a small portion of that humanity. They determine an animal to suffer a buildup of pain and lack of stimulation that is unbearable in its entirety.

However, I believe, first of all, that Janet is no more suffering at the aquarium than any human would suffer at their job. She has duties to perform and expectations of performance to meet. She has colleagues with whom she associates, and then she goes ‘home’ to eat and rest at the end of the day. If she is capable of the intellectualization the DLL claims she is, she must understand that she must earn her food, just like the rest of us.

Secondly, I believe that she is incapable of realizing that she has other options of life. Dolphins in the wild are caught in tuna nets, from which they could escape merely by leaping over the rim of the net. Jumping is a frequent and natural activity for a dolphin—they simply are incapable of reasoning out the solution to their problem. Similarly, I believe that Janet is incapable of reasoning that if she were elsewhere, she might be happier. Therefore, she is as happy as she will ever be, right here in Aqua-Zoo.

Thirdly, I hardly believe her to be suffering. She is free from danger, here, as there are no sharks or tuna nets, and she has a continuous supply of nutritious food. If she should occasionally feel other than happy, how is that different than any of the humans to whom the DLL wish to compare Janet?

The DLL activists wish to add up every minute of boredom Janet has ever experienced into some horrendous sum of sufferance. If one were to add up the suffering of a human in the same way, I would presume to declare the human the recipient of much more distress than any dolphin. Janet doesn’t have to worry about where the money is coming from to pay for her children’s education, a failing marriage or a dying father—all of which can be, very realistically, placed on the shoulders of one human (among a myriad of other problems)—all of which, added up, would outweigh Janet’s concerns (if indeed she has any). However, we know, perhaps from experience, that even a person loaded with such problems can be happy, as these problems change in priority, become more urgent, develop new facets. If, as the DLL claims, Janet is capable of intellectualization on the level of those considered to be ‘people’, she should be able to similarly shift the priorities of her problems, and experience happiness despite any imagined injustices. For these reasons, I find it hard to take the DLL activists seriously in their arguments.

Clearly, if an organism were to have vital organs removed, it would die, even though its brain was capable of continuance. Of course, if the body was dead, the brain would have no means to survive, but that is not the argument. The argument is that the brain need not necessarily be dead for the organism to be dead.

Neither need the organism be dead for the person to be dead. Though a body can be supported beyond the death of the whole brain, the person cannot be said to continue. Cerebral and neocortical death allow the body to continue to function via the activity of the brainstem, however there is no capacity for consciousness left in the brain. The organism continues to exist as a corpse after life stops. Thus, it is entirely probable that a person can die before their body dies.

The case also requires that we differentiate between being alive and having a life. Being alive is defined merely by the functioning of the organism, but having a life requires that organism to be conscious of the fact that it is alive (i.e. sentient—a person!). If, by some chance, some vestige of consciousness remains in Al’s PVS, unable to be expressed—in effect, unconscious consciousness—Al continues to exist.

In continuing to exist, I mean that Al’s person continues to exist, not merely her organism. However, the ‘person’ is unaware, in fact, fails to be categorized as ‘self-aware’ any longer because it is unconscious, and thus ceases to be a person under the arguments put forth earlier in this paper. In "The Metaphysics of Brain Death" however, the above conclusions were not reached or discussed, and are likewise irrelevant, as—as put forth in "Metaphysics"—for a ‘person’ who "continues to exist in a state of permanent unconsciousness, his life has…ceased to be worth living. It is…not a burden…for he is aware of nothing." Similarly, a ‘person’ exhibiting complete destruction of the cerebral cortex or neocortex has already ceased to exist, and no further argument is necessary as to whether the remaining, non-sentient organism should be kept functional.

Considering the fact that Al’s vital functions are still strong, her brain stem would most likely be in full or nearly-full capacity, rendering her body subject to many reflexive activities. Light, heat and motion would stimulate the remainder of her nervous system, but she would merely be reacting to her environment, not participating in it. This would place her on the lowest end of the intellectual scale outlined earlier in this paper, among the DNA’s, viruses, bacteria and other small, one-celled creatures. Her body would be sensitive to its environment, but not sentient. Sentience is one of the major qualifications of personhood, and lack thereof renders Al no longer a person. This does not automatically render her fodder for the coffin, but her lack of consciousness makes a good argument towards such an end. Those two conditions, added to the fact that she no longer has a life worth living, in such a state, make a fairly convincing case for removing life support to benefit others. Why support an empty shell when such care could mean the difference between life and death for a person, not the unconscious continuance of a mere organism.